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Reducing the Geographic Variance in Medical Expenditures: The Benefits of a
Primary-Care-Oriented Health System
Abstract
The Affordable Care Act states that a primary goal of health care reform should be to lower costs and
promote fiscal responsibility. With these two goals in mind, the bill proposes a more primary-care-oriented
health system by enacting a 5-year temporary Medicare fee increase for primary care physicians as a
means to increase the number of physicians and incentivize more primary care services. Using county
and regional level Medicare data, this paper finds that an increase in the number of primary care
physicians per capita would reduce per beneficiary Medicare spending and as a consequence, lower
national health expenditures substantially.
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I.
Introduction
The evaluation of a national health care system focuses on three major
criteria: cost, quality, and accessi. In all three categories, the United States
performs abysmally when compared with other OECD countries. For example,
per capita medical spending in the United States is approximately three times the
OECD average; yet life expectancy is lower, the infant mortality rate higher, and
the quality of care near last. The international consensus on the US health care
system is that Americans spend more, to get less, for a select fewii. However,
certain areas within the United States outperform OECD health care leaders like
Denmark, while other American cities perform significantly worse than even the
American average. In 2003 for example, the average Medicare beneficiary in
Minneapolis cost the federal government $5,428 and on average received
extremely high quality care, yet the average Medicare beneficiary in Miami
received a lower quality of care for $11,500iii.
Several researchers have noted that if the US could merely reduce the
highest spending areas to the American average, total Medicare spending could
drop nearly 30%iv. Thus, current researchers are intent on understanding these
small area variations (SAV) in health care spending and finding potential
solutions. Early research shows that the number of ordered tests, in-patient
services provided, and surgical operations performed account for a large portion
of the regional variation and that primary care physicians often limit the
overutilization of these expensive treatmentsv vi. Strong statistical evidence from
the medical field supports these claims with recent findings that primary care
directly reduces the number of hospital admissions, lowers readmission rates,
improves patient health, and provides more effective care than specialist carevii.
As a result, health care reformists and government officials have started to
consider policy measures that incentivize a more primary-care-oriented system as
part of a short and long term solution to the overutilization of care.
Currently, these policies tend to focus on incentivizing the primary care
physicians already present in the market to do more, and the specialists to think
carefully before recommending expensive treatments. However, few researchers
have focused on whether increasing the number of primary care physicians might
cause a more primary-care-oriented health care system that reduces
overutilization and leads to lower spending levels. Thus, I address the question of
whether increasing the number of primary care physicians in the United States can
lower national health care spending without lowering the quality of care.
My analysis reveals that significant reductions in national health expenditures,
as high as $2500viiiper Medicare beneficiary in some regions, can be achieved
through increasing the number of primary care physicians from their current
levels to the levels found in certain low-cost areas. These findings should spur
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further research and be considered in the current reforms of the U.S. health
system.
A short literature review is presented in Section 2, which is followed by a
presentation of the data and methods in section III. The aforementioned regression
results are discussed in depth by section IV with a short policy conclusion in
section V.
II.
Literature Review
The literature on primary care, defined as “health care at a basic rather than
specialized level for people making an initial approach to a doctor or nurse for
treatment”ix, grew rapidly in the early 2000s. The influx emerged from three
worrying trends: a perceived shortage of primary care physicians, a growing
number of primary care physicians rejecting Medicare patients, and a continually
shrinking pool of medical school graduates choosing primary carex.
Barbara Starfield, Leiyu Shi, and James Macinko, all noted writers in the
health care field, published a systematic review of the seminal works on the
effects primary care has on different aspects of the health care system with
“Contribution of Primary Care to Health Systems and Health.”xi The in-depth
review conducts a qualitative investigation of primary care’s role in the health
care field. The authors present a convincing case that an increased number of
primary care physicians and improved access would improve health for all
Americans, but especially the most marginalized, through lowering mortality
rates, improving self-assessed health, increasing life expectancy, and reducing
acute hospital admissions. Almost the entire document focuses on how primary
care affects health outcomes, not spending, yet these finding provide possible
avenues for primary care to affect per capita spending and provide a foundation
for my hypothesis.
Chandra and Baicker build from the compendium and earlier works by
studying the effects of the physician workforce’s composition on Medicare
spending and quality of care with an associational study using state-level data.
“Medicare Spending, The Physician Workforce, and Beneficiaries’ quality of
care” presents three main conclusions for state policy makers: higher Medicare
spending is associated with lower quality care, the relationship could potentially
be driven by intensive specialty care crowding out more effective basic care, and
states with more primary care physicians as percentage of all physicians tend to
have lower spending and a higher quality of care than the averagexii. The study
provides a strong policy brief but performs only basic statistical analysis at the
state level, which makes any definite conclusions hard to draw. Chandra and
Baicker do have other more regression-based analysis on related materials, but
focus more on the growth of medical spending.
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More mathematically rigorous studies have been conducted in areas
related to the topic, and Fisher et al. in “The implications of Regional variation in
Medicare Spending. Part 1:The Content, Quality, and Accessibility of Care”
provide the strongest quantitative evidence showing that the overutilization of
inpatient services plays a major role in driving excessive medical spending. They
find inpatient admissions and hospital days, frequency of tests and specialist
visits, and numbers of procedures account for large portions of the geographic
variance in spendingxiii. Following his research, I attempt to meld his findings
with earlier primary care research to see if primary care affects medical spending,
potentially through the avenues highlighted in earlier literature. Like Fisher, I
choose to take a more regression-based approach to test explicitly how primary
care affects spending with the hypothesis that the supply of primary care
physicians will significantly reduce the per capita level of Medicare spending.
III.

Study Data and Methods

Data Sources and Type
The dependent variable of Medicare spending per beneficiary comes from
the Dartmouth Health Atlas’s (DHA) comprehensive data set, which includes a
wide-variety of domestic health care data. The variable contains the Part A and
Part B reimbursements for all beneficiaries and is broken down into 306 hospital
referral regions (HRRs) that encompass the entire United States. I chose DHA
data over raw data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
because prior literature favors the former, due to the adjustments for price, race,
sex, & age built into the expenditures calculationsxiv. The price-adjustment is done
by diagnosis related groupings (DRG) weighting and allows for researchers to test
more accurately for other causes of regional variation, though price variations are
of concern. For several supplementary regressions, I work from disaggregated
portions of the total Medicare spending data that is broken into such components
as Hospital Reimbursements, Ambulatory care sensitive Hospital
Reimbursements, and Outpatient Reimbursements.
Additionally from Dartmouth Health Atlas, I take my primary variable of
interest, the number of primary care physicians per 100,000 residents in each
HRR. The label primary care physician applies broadly to general practitioners,
family practice doctors, and in my case geriatricians to compensate for my use of
Medicare data. Other hospital control variables come from the DHA data set as
well, such as the number of acute care hospital beds and end-of-life hospital
spending. Furthermore, the hospital quality index, also used in a supplementary
regression, includes a comprehensive assessment of the quality of care of each
hospital in the country calculated through an amalgamation of readmission rates,
effective procedures, consumer satisfaction, and several other indicators. Previous
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literature suggests that more primary care physicians in an area leads to higher
levels of quality in hospital care as well as lower recovery times for proceduresxv
xvi
, which my results generally support. The DHA provides average scores for
each HRR, which is what I include.
Several other databases provide important information for my control
variables such as the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF), the Census
Bureau (SAIPE), the Center for Medicare Services, and Area Resource File
(ARF). These databases provided county level data for income, health, education,
and demographic characteristics. From prior literature, I followed precedent in
assigning these variables to all 306 Hospital Referral Regions. Dartmouth Health
Atlas provides a lengthy and detailed explanation of how to assign counties and
zip codes to each HRR, which is provided in a convenient data set for merging.
The data was compiled in excel and then merged into a single data set for
regression analysis in STATA 13C.
A summary of the data is presented in Table 1 and shows the mean,
standard deviation, minimum, and maximum for the major control and interest
variables discussed in the results. In 2006, the average Medicare beneficiary
required almost $8,000 in care, but the standard deviation and divergent minimum
and maximum values show the regional variation present with an almost $8,500
difference between the lowest spending and highest spending region. The
disparities in poverty as well as spending in the last six months of life should be
noted, although the two are not correlated in any way. Worth noting as well from
a basic summary of the statistics is the wide variance in the number of primary
care physicians and medical specialists by HRR. The maximum number of
primary care physicians is nearly three times the minimum value and the same
wide disparity exists with the number of medical specialists.
Analysis and Methods:
To disentangle the relationship between the number of primary care
physicians and the level of total Medicare spending at the HRR level, I use leastsquares linear regression, following precedent. The primary variables of interest
are the level of Medicare spending per beneficiary and the number of primary
care physicians per resident, which are then supplemented by a number of
controls.
In an attempt to control for health status across HRR, I use percent of
individuals who smoke regularly, the self-reported health average, and the adult
obesity rate. Few previous regressions have controlled for health based upon the
inability to have data on the specific Medicare beneficiaries, yet I choose to do so
because of the strong correlation between many county level demographic and
income statistics for the elderly and young.
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To control for socioeconomic issues, I used poverty rates and percent of
persons with only a high school degree. Poverty rate captures such statistics as
employment status, income, and other household characteristics and explains
more variation in Medicare spending than other combinations of wealth
variablesxvii. Educational level is commonly controlled for through the portion of
a population with only a high school degree.
For medical controls, I controlled for a culture of high intensity care,
commonly cited in literature, with the total amount of spending in the last six
months of life, which also has precedent in earlier literature and makes logical
sense. Physicians willing to undertake expensive procedures that cost substantial
sums of money to save an individual in the last six months should also be willing
to spend higher sums of money in general on the care of individuals in a region. I
used number of hospital beds to control for supply driven care that might come
from the attitude “We have the beds so let’s fill them.” To test for physicianinduced demand, I control for the number of specialists in a region because of
recent literature that suggests specialists induce more procedures than necessary
for the increased monetary benefits of performing more proceduresxviii.
Before moving to the results, I wish to note several possible econometric
issues with testing my intended hypothesis. First of all, there is a considerable
issue with finding the direction of causality and the potential for simultaneity bias
in my equation. Primary care physicians may work in areas where there are high
levels of Medicare spending in an attempt to increase incomes. This would hurt
my ability to find a significant effect. On the other hand, Medicare offers very low
reimbursement rates and may cause primary care physicians to leave areas with
high levels of Medicare spending, which might actually strengthen some of my
results. Furthermore, many of the control variables contain some degree of
correlation and make discerning causality all that much harder.
Additionally, heteroscedasticity could be an issue as variance might vary
with larger populations, different attitudes toward health, and demographic
characteristics for spending as well as many of the control variables. For this
reason, I used heteroscedasticity-controlled standard errors to remove bias from
my hypotheses tests. Lastly, my model may suffer from omitted variable bias
because there are many variables that are nearly impossible to control for in the
health care market as far personal relationships between hospitals and insurers,
market power, state regulations etc. Furthermore, the health care market is so
interconnected that causality is almost impossible to establish, yet regressions still
provide helpful information that should be used to formulate policy.
IV.
Results & Discussion
Before discussing regression results, see Graph 1 for a basic correlation graph
of the number of primary care physicians per resident and total Medicare
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spending per beneficiary for each HRR. Though no specific avenue of impact can
be identified through a basic correlation, the -.4 correlation value between the two
variables shows a strong association but falls short of showing any stronger
evidence. The negative association results between the two variables is not
surprising but nevertheless, provides a strong point of departure for more
analytical regression results.
The regression results reinforce the earlier correlation graph and shows that an
increase in one primary care physician per 100,000 residents, while holding all
other regressed variables constant, will reduce total Medicare spending for Part A
and Part B by $44 on average for a HRR region (see table 2). The finding is
consistent with earlier research that shows primary care reduces overutilization of
expensive services, which then would reduce Medicare spending levels, but my
regression results provide strong evidence that the supply of primary care
physicians is worth considering for policy measures. The results are not only
statistically significant with a t-score of 9.09 but also are economically significant
as can be shown by the following analysis. If the average HRR increased the
number of primary care physicians by a single standard deviation, Medicare
spending per beneficiary would drop by about $528. The amount may not seem
substantial but that there were are 49.5 million Medicare beneficiaries in the
United States in 2013 and the number has risen substantially since. The result
would be a reduction in Medicare Spending nationally of over $26.1 billion
dollars for 2013, which does not take into account the benefits provided to the rest
of the population.
Several other coefficients, beside the variable of interest, are worth noting in
conjunction with other theories about the causes for small area variation in
medical spending. The total specialists variable is not positively significant, which
may suggest physician-induced demand, at least among specialists, is not as
prominent as many have feared. The evidence is not conclusive by any means,
since we are only looking at the broad measure of all specialists in a region, but
the result is worth note. However, the number of hospital beds in a region is
statistically significant and carries a large economic significance too. The 486.97
regression coefficient suggests that each additional hospital bed per 1000
residents adds almost $487 dollars per Medicare beneficiary in average spending.
The result provides support for the idea that hospitals will keep the beds in the
hospital full to maximize revenue. Although not an unexpected result, it provides
evidence that supply driven spending takes place in health care markets.
The signs and significances of the other control variables match with theory
and do not provide any surprising results. The only other variable worth
mentioning is the significance of the logged Medicare enrollees per region. The
result suggests that having more Medicare enrollees in an HRR leads to a higher
level of spending per beneficiary. The finding might suggest that regions with
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large Medicare populations cater more to the needs of the elderly and might even
target the elderly, likely Medicare beneficiaries, for more intensive care knowing
Medicare covers the fees. While the evidence for such a theory is vague at best,
the result deserves further research.
In exploring how primary care physicians reduce spending, we can see from
table 3, which holds regression results for discharges for ambulatory care
sensitive cases in hospitals as the dependent variable and the number of primary
care physicians per beneficiary as the variable of interest, that one way is through
unnecessary visits to the hospital. Ambulatory care sensitive discharges measures
the number of patients a hospital admits for issues like asthma, diabetes, or minor
injuries that could be taken care of by a primary care physician. The regression
shows that increasing the supply of primary care physicians by 1 physician per
100, 000 residents while holding all other regressed variables constant, reduces
the number of ambulatory care sensitive discharges by almost a quarter of a visit
per 1,000 Medicare beneficiaries and is statistically significant. While that may
not seem substantial, the average hospital admission now costs $2,168xix, so the
quarter of a visit reduction in the number of discharges associated with adding
one primary care physician per 100,000 residents results in about $542 per
hospital discharge for an Ambulatory Care Sensitive condition among Medicare
beneficiaries.
A common argument against reducing spending states that quality will
diminish with less spending, although there is substantial evidence that more
spending often leads to lower quality carexx. My regression data actually suggests
that hospital quality will improve with an increase in primary care physicians,
though not in a meaningful way. In table 4, the number of primary care physicians
holds economic significance with the dependent variable of hospital quality,
though the increase in quality is marginal at best. For this reason, primary care
should not be used as a policy mechanism to increase the quality of care in
hospitals, as it is fairly inefficient, but the results provide support for the argument
that Medicare spending can be reduced without harming the already low quality
of care in the United States.
V.
Policy Recommendations and Conclusions
The regression results support policy reform that increases the supply of
primary care physicians in the United States as a means to reduce the high levels
of Medicare expenditure per beneficiary as well as overall health care spending.
While my results do not explicitly show how primary care reduces spending, there
is a substantial literature that suggests one major avenue is through the reducing
the overutilization of tests, procedures, in-patient services, and superfluous care.
These effects would take place quickly and would be further built upon by a longterm improvement in health for Americans, which might hold a more long-term
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solution to exorbitant medical cost levels. Even with such substantial benefits,
engineering policies to increase the supply of primary care physicians is not easy
or without political traps.
There are many methods to increase the supply of primary care physicians,
essentially ways to incentivize and subsidize primary care physicians, yet as many
economists would note using a basic supply and demand model that an increase in
the supply would only further depress wages for primary care physicians. These
reduced wages would only widen the incredible wage gap between primary care
physicians and specialist doctors, which plays a large role, in my opinion, in the
original shortage. I argue that is not the case with right set of policies and
incentives.
The wages of primary care physicians are hardly tied to the market price of
their services due to third party payers in the form of large insurance companies
and the federal government. Therefore, it is possible to raise the incomes of
primary care physicians even if the market price for their services drops with the
increase in supply. This seemingly paradoxical result could be achieved by setting
much higher reimbursement minimums for insurance companies, Medicare, and
Medicaid through the federal government. In fact, primary care physicians only
receive about between 5% to 30% of the market price currently for their services
under Medicare, and even less for Medicaid and some large insurers because of a
lack of market powerxxi. If that number were to be increased to 50% across the
board, incomes as well as lifetime earnings for primary care physicians would
increase dramatically even with a slightly lower market price. Therefore, I agree
with the ACA initiative to increase Medicare reimbursement fees, although I
would argue for a larger permanent increase across all payment parties rather than
the small temporary Medicare increase in the bill.
In addition to raising the reimbursement rates for primary care physicians, I
would provide debt alleviation for medical school students who choose primary
care to achieve quicker changes in the supply of primary care physiciansxxii. With
less debt and higher incomes, primary care physicians would receive more
adequate compensation for the value contributed to the health care market. As
critics will note, the measures to increase the supply of primary care physicians
will cost money, but with the large savings from reduced medical spending and an
overall healthier population, I believe the cost for such measures will pale in
comparison to the savings.
A more controversial, but possibly more effective, policy would be to allow
the immigration of highly qualified primary care physicians to the United states
along with the increased compensation methods shown earlier in order to keep
incomes from dropping substantially. The increase in supply would be immediate,
rather than take place over 4 years, and might achieve similar results, although
more research into the topic should be done. Additionally, further research should
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formally look to do a cost benefit analysis of subsidizing an increase in primary
care physicians as a possible solution to high levels of medical spending.
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Data Appendix

Table 1
Variable

Summary Table
Mean
Std. Dev.

Total Medicare Reimbursement
with Price, Age, Sex, and Race Adj.
Hospital Specific Medicare
Reimbursement with Price, Age,
Sex, and Race Adj.
Outpatient Specific Medicare
Reimbursement with Price, Age,
Sex, and Race Adj.
Total Number of Medicare
Enrollees
Ambulatory Care Sensitive
Hospital Discharges
Number of Acute Care Hospital
Beds per 1,000 Residents
Primary Care Physicians per
100,000 Residents
Total Specialists per 100,000
Residents
People Living in Poverty (Percent)
People with only a high school
degree (Percent)
Residents Self-Reporting Fair to
Poor Health (Percent)
Obese Adult Residents (Percent)
Regular Smoking Residents
(Percent)
Average Spending in the Last 6
months of life
Average Age of Beneficiary

Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2015

Min

Max

$7,944

$1,155

$5,634

$14,011

$3,967

$618

$2,506

$5,837

$857

$190

$457

$1,645

92,959

84,717

15,502

508,813

74.9

18.0

29.7

135.2

2.5

0.6

1.4

4.7

70.5

12.0

43.9

117.0

120.1
14%

20.8
5%

68.3
4%

215.0
37%

29%

6%

9%

49%

15%
26%

4%
4%

0%
13%

33%
35%

20%

5%

0%

40%

$13,027
71.6

$3,454
1.4

$7,788
67.0

$32,633
75.0
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Table 3
Hospital Discharges for Ambulatory Sensative Care
Number of obs = 306
F( 12, 293) = 48.17
Prob > F = 0.000
R-squared = 0.70
Dependent Variable
Root MSE = 10.00
Hospital Discharges For
Ambulatory Sensitive
Care
Independent Variables
Coef.
Std. Err. T-Score
P>t
Primary Care Physicians
per 100,000 Residents
-0.240
0.076
-3.17
0.002
Total Specialists per
100,000 Residents
0.008
0.044
0.18
0.856
Number of Acute Care
Hospital Beds per 1,000
16.573
1.149
14.43
0.000
CMS Hospital Quality
Score
1.502
27.075
0.06
0.956
Last 6 months Medicare
Spending per decedent
0.002
0.000
7.07
0.000
People with only a high
school degree (Percent)
0.307
0.116
2.65
0.008
People Living in Poverty
(Percent)
-0.021
0.152
-0.14
0.892
Ln(Total Number of
Medicare Enrollees)
1.748
0.883
1.98
0.049
Average Age of
Beneficiary
-3.211
0.515
-6.24
0.000
Regular Smoking
Residents (Percent)
0.410
0.154
2.67
0.008
Residents SelfReporting Fair to Poor
-0.350
0.168
-2.09
0.038
Obese Adult Residents
(Percent)
0.480
0.241
1.99
0.048
Constant
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212.397

42.002

5.06

0.000
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Table 4
Hospital Quality of Care
Number of obs = 306
F( 11, 294) = 4.65
Prob > F = 0.000
R-squared = 0.17
Root MSE= .025

Dependent Variable
CMS Hospital Quality Score

Independent Variable
Primary Care Physicians per
100,000 Residents
Total Specialists per 100,000
Residents
Number of Acute Care Hospital
Beds per 1,000 Residents
Last 6 months Medicare
Spending per decedent
People with only a high school
degree (Percent)
People Living in Poverty
(Percent)
Ln (Total Number of Medicare
Enrollees)
Average Age of Beneficiary
Regular Smoking Residents
(Percent)
Residents Self-Reporting Fair
to Poor Health (Percent)
Obese Adult Residents
(Percent)
Constant

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol11/iss1/6

Std.
Err.

Coef.

T-Score

P>t

0.05394 0.0161

3.35

0.001

-0.00726 0.0128

-0.57

0.572

-0.08432 0.3465

-0.24

0.808

0

-0.31

0.755

-0.00114 0.0310

-0.04

0.971

-0.09281 0.0450

-2.06

0.040

0.07817 0.2079

0.38

0.707

0.32364 0.1279

2.53

0.012

0.13565 0.0448

3.02

0.003

-0.04386 0.0447

-0.98

0.328

0.0257 0.0579

0.44

0.658

6.55

0.000

0

0.62382

0.0951
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Table 5
Outpatient Spending
Number of obs = 306
F( 10, 295) = 14.28
Prob > F = 0
R-squared = 0.32
Root MSE = 158.49
Dependent Variable
Outpatient Spending
per Medicare
Beneficiary
Independent Variables
Primary Care Physicians
per 100,000 Residents
Total Specialists per
100,000 Residents
Number of Acute Care
Hospital Beds per 1,000
CMS Hospital Quality
Score
Last 6 months Medicare
Spending per decedent
People with only a high
school degree (Percent)
People Living in Poverty
(Percent)
Ln(Total Number of
Medicare Enrollees)
Average Age of
Beneficiary
Regular Smoking
Residents (Percent)
Constant
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Coef.

Std. Err.

t

P>t

7.29

1.11

6.55

0.000

-2.78

0.73

-3.82

0.000

112.86

17.39

6.49

0.000

929.04

359.68

2.58

0.010

-0.01

0.00

-3.18

0.002

2.25

1.70

1.32

0.187

-0.15

2.35

-0.06

0.949

-7.45

12.97

-0.57

0.566

17.60

7.59

2.32

0.021

-0.36

2.21

-0.16

0.871

-1,542.38

610.26

-2.53

0.012
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